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Abstract 
Rotorua was New Zealand’s first tourism destination, rising to prominence a hundred 
years ago on the back of the central government’s vision for a South Pacific spa to 
rival those of Europe. Government resources were used to develop and support 
Rotorua’s infrastructure and tourism industry, like no other in the British 
Commonwealth, for the best part of the 20th century. By the 1980s however, Rotorua’s 
tourism industry was in a crisis; and it is posited that the crisis was largely self-
inflicted. The paper provides an historical summary of key events leading to the crisis, 
and subsequent efforts to regain destination competitiveness through a public-private 
partnership. Written from the perspective of the CEO of the destination’s inaugural 
regional tourism organisation charged with co-ordinating the marketing response to 
the crisis, the case provides a cautionary tale of how one destination’s success as a 
destination has risen, fallen and risen in line with government intervention. 
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Introduction 
The primary role of any destination marketing organisation (DMO) is to foster market 
competitiveness. Since achieving competitiveness is now a major challenge for most 
destinations (WTTC, 2002), this is as much an issue of significance to individual 
businesses as it is to DMOs. After all, the success of individual businesses is to a large 
extent reliant on the competitiveness of that destination (Pike, 2004), particularly in 
places affected by disasters and crises.  
 
Many DMOs at national and local levels started life as government departments. 
Although there has been a shift in structure towards limited liability companies, trusts 
and public-private partnerships, most DMO funding remains from government. Many 
outside the tourism industry have questioned why taxes should be used in destination 
marketing to ‘subsidise tourism businesses’. A political implication of this has been 
witnessed in the USA, where lack of Congress support for a national tourism office is 
a result of a strong political lobby arguing this would represent ‘corporate welfare’ 
(Gatty & Blalock, 1997). Without government intervention, particularly in the form of 
financial resources, most DMOs would not exist in their current form. Government 
withdrawal of funding in Colorado, Maine and California in recent years (see Doering 
1979, Donnelly & Vaske 1997) provides indications of how destination marketing 
activities can be curtailed through a drop in budget that cannot be reimbursed through 
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corporate sponsorship or membership levies. For example, Colorado slipped from 3rd 
to 17th in terms of traveller recognition of state destinations, and visits by pleasure 
travellers decreased by up to 10% in the short term. In 2003 the governor of 
California proposed the state tourism office be closed as a cost saving measure when 
the state faced a $35 billion shortfall (Inbound, 13 January 2003, p. 1). Such a 
withdrawal of government funding can lead to a tourism crisis. In 2006 for example, 
Tourism Waikato, one of New Zealand’s regional tourism organisations (RTO), had 
its budget unexpectedly cut in half by the local government (see Coventry, 2006, p.1). 
Tourism Waikato’s Chief Executive Officer lamented: “It’s a very gut wrenching 
situation. Marketing of the whole Waikato will be suspended until funding 
regenerates”. 
 
Increasing attention in the tourism literature is being devoted to destination disaster 
management. This has been particularly evident in the new millennium; a time when 
the competitiveness of many destinations has been tested by a diverse range of 
exogenous events involving terrorism, acts of God, and threats of pandemics. In the 
case of such ‘wildcard events’, described by Hall (2005) as being low probability but 
high impact, the destination’s recovery will depend on the level of preparedness. Hall 
rightly argued there exists a tendency in tourism to assume the unthinkable will not 
happen. This may imply a view that the future will continue to evolve as per the past, 
and in this paper it is argued management’s unpreparedness for a different future can 
lead to a crisis.  
 
A crisis is a self-inflicted situation caused by inept management practises or an 
inability to adapt to a changing environment (Faulkner, 1999). A disaster on the other 
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hand is a sudden catastrophic event over which the DMO has little or no control. In 
the emerging literature on destination disaster management, there have been a number 
of very useful cases about DMO responses to a wide range of disasters such as 
cyclones (Faulkner & Vikulov, 2001), Foot and Mouth disease (Frisby, 2002), bush 
fires (Christine, 1995), travel advisories (Beirman 2003), war (Mansfield, 1999), 
violence (Leslie, 1999) and terrorism (Hopper, 2002). While destinations in decline 
have also been mentioned in the literature, including Hamm (Buckley & Witt, 1985), 
Majorca (Morgan, 1991), Canada (Go, 1987), Bermuda (Conlin, 1995), and 
Amsterdam (Dahles, 1998), little has been reported about attempts by a destination to 
recover from such a management crisis. This paper documents a tourism crisis that 
emerged through the inability by a resort destination’s stakeholders to adapt to a 
changing environment. A historical perspective elucidating the context of the crisis, 
involving a significant review of archival material, is followed by a reflexive narrative 
of recovery efforts from the perspective of the inaugural RTO manager appointed to 
coordinate marketing aspects of the recovery. In this regard the paper joins other 
practitioner reflections on practical DMO challenges (see for example Curtis 2001, 
Frisby 2002).  
 
The destination of interest is Rotorua, which was New Zealand’s first tourism resort 
area. Singled out by the country’s government in the late 1800s as a future 
‘Sanatorium of the earth’, the area became a beneficiary of levels of support only 
dreamed of by other New Zealand regions. The New Zealand government built 
infrastructure, accommodation, spas, tourist attractions and transport, handled the 
majority of all domestic and overseas promotion, and even operated the local visitor 
information centre for 90 years. However, Rotorua’s star status within the New 
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Zealand tourism industry, which the destination had enjoyed for the best part of a 
century, declined to such a point that by the late 1980s the local tourism industry was 
considered to be in a state of crisis.  
 
Rotorua – Sanatorium of the Earth! 
Rotorua has a short-recorded history by international standards. The township was 
officially created in 1880, through the British Crown’s ‘Fenton Agreement’ with the 
Maori owners. The first non-indigenous visitors were traders (see Cowan, 1935) and 
missionaries (see Tapsell, 1972) during the 1830s. The first tourist was thought to be 
naturalist John Bidwell, in 1839, who later published the book Rambles in New 
Zealand (Stafford, 1977). The reason for the early visitation was to experience the 
Pink and White Terraces. These were impressive silica terraces, probably similar to 
Turkey’s white terraces at Pamukkale, formed from mineral deposits in the 
geothermally heated water. An attraction for visitors was the opportunity to bath in 
the natural recesses of the terraces. There were few other tourist attractions in New 
Zealand at this time (Reggett, 1972).  
 
The systematic colonisation of New Zealand began in the 1840s (Cushman, 1990), 
and the first settlement of Europeans at Rotorua occurred in 1856 (Tapsell, 1972). By 
this time, the potential of Rotorua’s geothermal waters was attracting attention. In 
1859 the Auckland Provincial Government commissioned Austrian Geologist Dr 
Ferdinand Von Hochstetter to document the ‘Natural Characteristics of the Thermal 
Area’ in southern Auckland (Reggett 1972, Tapsell 1972). While Von Hochstetter’s 
ensuing report is credited with generating much interest in the region, it was the 1870 
visit of the Duke of Edinburgh and accompanying media that stimulated the first real 
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growth of tourist traffic (Steele, 1980). The Duke’s visit, along with other luminaries 
such as Mark Twain, is said to have established Rotorua in the wealthy social circles 
of America and Europe (Reggett, 1972), and a part of the ‘grand tour’ of the colonies 
(Savage, 1986).  
 
Disaster struck in 1886 when Mount Tarawera erupted, destroying three Maori 
villages and obliterating the terraces. While this was a devastating blow for tourism, 
within two years Rotorua’s annual visitor arrivals were higher than pre-eruption levels 
(Reggett, 1972). Part of the continued interest in Rotorua was the eruption aftermath 
and new volcanic craters, which remain attractions today and evidence of Ahmed’s 
(1991) suggestion of a dark side to tourism. Interest was also directed towards the 
therapeutic values of the remaining geothermal features (Stafford, 1986).  
 
Brown’s (1985) analysis of the evolution of 19th century British resort development, 
noted the medical profession was responsible for much of the initial resort 
development impetus in that country. In New Zealand it was English balneologist, Dr 
Wohlmann, who in 1902, following a tour of European spas, convinced the New 
Zealand government of the value of the sanatorium concept (Stafford, 1988). Central 
government planned to develop Rotorua as “a hot water mineral spa on much the 
same lines as the famous European and English spas such as Vichy, Carlsbad, Bath 
and Harrogate” (Savage, 1980, p. 5). Wohlmann convinced the government to invest 
all available resources in the development of one spa, Rotorua, rather than spread 
resources around the country (Herbert, 1921, p. vii). 
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The attempt to make Rotorua the great spa of the southern hemisphere floundered in 
the depression years and World War Two (Rockel, 1980a), and by the 1950s the 
government had dispensed with the Rotorua sanatorium concept (Stafford, 1988). 
Rotorua District Council (RDC, 1992) attributed failure to a number of factors, 
including: long distance from markets, lengthy travel times, slow internal travel 
options within New Zealand, high plant maintenance costs in the acidic environment, 
too few people using the facilities, and a relatively strong medical (Sanatorium) focus 
that fell from vogue in the 1920s as modern medicinal practices expanded.  
 
Reliance on government resources 
No other town in New Zealand has a more complex legislative history than Rotorua 
(Rockel, 1980b). Although a town board was formed in 1880, the town was to be 
managed by the New Zealand Department of Tourist & Health Resorts. New 
Zealand’s establishment of a national tourism office (NTO) in 1901 was the first of its 
kind in the world (Steele, 1980), as was the development of a government operated 
visitor information network in New Zealand and overseas, named Government Tourist 
Bureaux (Coventry, 2001). The first office was built in Rotorua in 1903. While the 
NTO and Government Tourist Bureaux were the most important elements in the 
promotion of Rotorua during the 20th century, central government also funded almost 
everything in the development of Rotorua: “No other town in the country enjoyed 
such support from public funds” (Stafford, 1986, p. 36). It has been claimed Rotorua 
was the only town in the British Empire to have been completely controlled by central 
government (Braynart, 1980). Rotorua did not have an independent council, devoid of 
government representatives, until 1950 (Stafford 1988, Tapsell 1972).  
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Rotorua’s increasingly forced independence from central government from the 1950s 
coincided with a steady decline in destination image. Signs of Rotorua’s impending 
demise started during the 1960s. One particularly high profile incident occurred in 
1965, when the president of the Travel Agents Association of New Zealand described 
Rotorua as the most squalid place in the country (Steele, 1980). Council had not 
helped the cause with the development of the town’s rubbish tip on the Lake Rotorua 
foreshore, adjacent to the central business district, and the release of sewerage into the 
lake after only partial treatment. Little wonder an overseas scientist gained national 
media coverage when he labelled the lake an ‘unflushed toilet’ in the 1970s. In 1978, 
two hundred people attending a tourism conference reached consensus that Rotorua 
was losing its ‘oomph’ against other centres (Stafford, 1988).  
 
A private sector response to the image problems in the 1970s was the formation of the 
Rotorua Promotion Society, which was to be funded by member subscriptions. After a 
decade of funding uncertainty the organisation succeeded in gaining an RDC grant of 
$65,000 per annum for three years. In return for this modest sum RDC imposed 
considerable responsibilities: overseas and domestic promotion, organisation of an 
annual Christmas carnival, a seven-day a week accommodation booking service, a 
show ticketing service, promotion of Rotorua as a conference centre, and general 
visitor enquiries. 
 
The 1980s were a challenging decade for the New Zealand tourism industry due to 
changing travel patterns. For example, from 1983 to 1988 domestic person nights 
decreased from 61.4 million to 53.1 million (NZTP, 1989/2), while international 
visitor arrivals doubled (Pearce 1990). Changes in international arrivals led to a 
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greater diversification of the market. Prior to this, tourism in New Zealand had mostly 
focused on “passive sightseeing of a range of natural scenic resources” (Cushman, 
1990, p. 13). In this era Rotorua was firmly established on the blue ribbon route of 
coach tour itineraries, and thus assured of a steady flow of group tourists. One of the 
leading suppliers was central government’s own coach tour operation, Tiki Tours. A 
shift away from coach touring towards self-drive holidays opened up more 
destinations to travellers and shifted distribution control away from a small group of 
inbound tour operators, from which Rotorua relied heavily. Drive tourism opened 
opportunities for less traditional destinations that began to emerge as serious 
competition to Rotorua. There was also a sense of NTO abandonment of Rotorua in 
overseas promotion in favour of the South Island’s snowy mountain scenes. The 
changing travel patterns, increased competition, and decline in Rotorua’s image led 
the Rotorua Promotion Society to commission a consultancy to provide a situation 
analysis of Rotorua at this time. Key points were (PA Hotels and Tourism, 1987):  
 
• Local and national media were biased in their negative publicity  
• Rotorua was developing into a town that was not particularly attractive 
• Rotorua was stagnant, even going backwards, and living on its reputation 
• The Mayor and councillors were not seen to be supporting tourism  
• Poor destination marketing relative to other communities 
• Rotorua did not communicate itself well, and needed professional help 
 
Denial of the image problems remained strong in the mid-1980s among some civic 
leaders, perhaps best encapsulated in a quote by Mayor John Keaney: “It is in the 
interests of other centres to carry out a vendetta against Rotorua to put tourists off 
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coming here” (Rotorua Daily Post, 13/8/86). Keaney was commenting on reports in 
the Dominion newspaper under the heading ‘Death of a Tourist town’, and related 
television news. However, such denial by council was ultimately not sustainable given 
the number of issues compounding the image problems:  
 
• The third highest unemployment in New Zealand, at 13% (Stafford, 1988). 
• National media coverage of scientific claims that Rotorua’s famous geysers 
were dying (Hindley, 1989). 
• The national recession brought Rotorua commercial property development to a 
standstill (Stafford, 1988). 
• High rent from out of town landlords forced retail closures, leading to an 
abundance of empty shops in the central business district. 
• A run down central business district due to a lack of council investment. 
 
Crisis acknowledgement 
The year 1988 proved a watershed in Rotorua’s destination life cycle. Frustrated by a 
lack of funding, industry in-fighting, and inability to reposition the destination’s 
tarnished image, the Rotorua Promotion Society board resigned en masse and 
abdicated its RDC agreement. Finally acknowledging a tourism crisis, RDC sought 
comment from the public, with the majority of submissions recommending RDC 
needed to take control of tourism promotion. Council agreed to the establishment of a 
Promotion and Marketing Co-ordinator position, to which I was appointed in January 
1989:  
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In response to Rotorua’s serious economic crisis in the late 1980s, the 
Rotorua District Council initiated a series of strategic changes…to 
employ somebody ‘solely’ responsible for the tourism and business 
development of Rotorua (Ateljevic & Doorne, 2000, p. 28). 
 
 
Incidentally, I began my DMO career in 1978 as a cadet with the then NZ Tourist & 
Publicity Department, initially at the Rotorua Government Tourist Bureau. This was 
Rotorua’s visitor information office, and at this time still managed a number of 
number of facilities such as Waimangu Volcanic Valley, Blue Baths, Government 
Gardens, The Bath House, and launches on lakes Rotomahana and Tarawera. 
 
The sense of crisis permeated all of my initial discussions with a wide range of 
stakeholders, with no semblance of any recovery plan. As noted by Hall (1999), the 
need for coordination is felt most when there is a lack of it. One of the most obvious 
problems noted during my initial meetings with industry groups was the disparate 
nature of the tourism community. There were strong feelings, vented angrily on 
occasions, that Rotorua Promotion Society promotions had only promoted the larger 
businesses, referred to as the ‘fat cats’. These larger operators explained to me that 
since they contributed the majority of funding, it was only fair to expect more 
promotional exposure. This is in keeping with Hall’s suggestion to temper 
expectations of collaborative tourism planning due to the narrow focus of, and 
dominance by, the larger corporate entities, to the detriment of other community 
stakeholders. Suspicion reigned, and what was needed was an impartial marketing 
organisation . 
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Recovery efforts 
The expectation of RDC senior management and elected officials was that the council 
investment (initially $250,000 per annum) should be seen as seed funding for the 
development of a cooperative private-public fighting fund. There was a clear 
expectation that a significant industry contribution be forthcoming. It was evident my 
initial priorities needed to focus on gaining the trust of small businesses and to 
develop a cooperative approach towards destination promotion. Regarding the former, 
efforts were made to ensure that no favours were intentionally provided to the larger 
operators. All new staff were explicitly inducted into this philosophy. Unfortunately, 
although the office was successful in ensuring equal opportunities for all operators, 
the political implications were the larger operators felt a loss of control. Clearly all 
tourism businesses seek to have their product exposed in all campaigns in all markets, 
and the altruistic philosophy of promoting strengths suited to different markets and 
segments was challenging to maintain. The staff are to be credited for their 
determination and courage in this regard. The politics of destination decision making 
is rarely addressed in the literature, but put simply, can play a major role in frustrating 
best intended efforts.  
 
The main aims of the recovery were to stimulate co-operative promotions by local 
operators, enhance tourism awareness among the host community, and improve the 
destination’s tarnished image in key markets. Key initiatives included: 
 
• Stronger links were initiated with the NTO by organising group sales 
missions to key offshore markets based around NTO participation at trade and 
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consumer travel events. Prior to this time, there was minimal presence by 
tourism businesses and regions at offshore promotional events. 
• Formation of the Rotorua Tourism Forum, which brought together 30 
representatives of sector groups, for quarterly meetings about destination 
issues and presentations by guest speakers such as the NZ Minister of 
Tourism and NTO CEO. Businesses not involved in formal sector groups 
were challenged to form groups and to be proactive in developing initiatives 
to work with the RTO. Successes in this regard included the adventure 
operators and Maori tourism operators. 
• Funding was provided to the Rotorua Promotion Society to participate in 
domestic travel expos. While the society remained resource poor, a strength 
was the their voluntary manpower to organise displays at domestic events, 
which freed RTO staff for other activities. 
• An alliance with other RTOs to form ‘Top Half NZ’, which linked Rotorua, 
Auckland and Northland as a macro region in promotions targeting the 
Australian market. 
• A series of double page advertisements was scheduled in the country’s most 
popular newspaper. Each operator was able to obtain equal size exposure, 
with the proceeds subsidising the accompanying advertorial space. 
• A printed destination visitor’s guide, which instead of being contracted out to 
a publisher, as was previously the case, was produced by the office. This 
carried some political risk since one of the publishers was also an elected 
council official. The incentive for advertisers was that the brochure would be 
used in all domestic and offshore promotions and used to service visitor 
enquires. This was an important initiative that generated an annual surplus 
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enabling a $100,000+  domestic television advertising campaign each year. 
Thus, this was tangible evidence of industry contributions to the RDC budget, 
which in a regime without a room tax, could never be raised by membership 
subscriptions as previously attempted by the Rotorua Promotions Society.  
• Ongoing efforts were made to stimulate tourism awareness among the host 
community. An early success was a destination-wide open day of tourism 
attractions. All tourism attractions provided free admission for local residents 
for a day. The initiative stimulated an ongoing admission structure for locals 
by attractions. Other activities included regular newspaper columns, radio 
interviews and talks to schools and service clubs. 
• Implementation of a new brand positioning theme, which while designed to 
reposition the destination image in the domestic market, was used in all 
markets.  
• The establishment of a commercial accommodation monitor to provide 
performance measures by which RDC could determine some sort of return on 
investment. It is difficult to quantify Rotorua’s rise and fall and rise in terms 
of visitor statistics, since there were no reliable data for the Rotorua region 
prior to this. Since 1990, businesses and RDC have enjoyed month by month 
data, completed by the majority of accommodation houses. The monitor 
would later become a model for a nationwide commercial accommodation 
monitor used by all New Zealand RTOs. 
 
In addition to the marketing activities, RDC’s commitment to enhancing Rotorua’s 
destination competitiveness has included a combination of infrastructure investments, 
including: 
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• A $30 million beautification of the central shopping district and lakefront, and  
• Redevelopment of the Government Gardens and Bathhouse  
• Development of a new visitor information centre, Convention Centre and 
exhibition centre  
• Commissioning of market feasibility studies that ultimately led to new private 
sector hotel developments 
• Airport runway extensions to enable future international aircraft arrivals 
 
Turning around a negative image does not occur overnight. With the benefit of 
hindsight, Wahab, Crampon and Rothfield’s (1976, p. 92) reflections on negative 
tourism images were certainly appropriate in Rotorua’s case: “It is easy to downgrade 
a product or allow it to deteriorate; but it is the devil’s own work to upgrade a low-
image product”. It would be an understatement to suggest the task of repositioning 
Rotorua in the domestic market was recognised as representing a significant 
challenge. One senior airline official commented at the time: “If you can turn Rotorua 
around you will be able to write your own ticket!” Even though significant efforts had 
been made since 1989, Rotorua’s negative image was still so serious in 1992 the NTO 
undertook an analysis of the local tourism industry and infrastructure:  
 
The study is being carried out in the context of industry concern that 
Rotorua as one of New Zealand’s major tourism hubs could be in 
decline and unless rejuvenated could lose its focus as a major tourism 
destination, either as part of the traditional touring circuit or as a 
regional tourism hub. Taupo has been suggested as a potential 
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challenger to Rotorua’s position as the central North Island main 
tourism hub (NZTB, 1992, p. 2).  
 
With the increasing funding support of RDC, and increasing industry cooperation, the 
sole position evolved into an RTO, Tourism Rotorua. Remaining responsible to RDC, 
the mission statement for the RTO clearly indicates the rationale for the council’s 
ongoing tourism funding: To enhance the economic base of Rotorua by the vigorous 
marketing of the district as a tourism destination (www.rotoruanz.com). The RTO is a 
public-private partnership. The majority of funding is provided by the RDC, who also 
employ all RTO staff. For governance purposes, senior management report directly to 
RDC. However, staff also work with a tourism advisory board, which also includes 
elected council officials, to develop marketing plans. Additionally, a series of 
portfolio groups was established to focus on key strategic issues. Portfolio group 
members are elected by industry to work with RTO staff. The public-private 
partnership structure has been successful as a mechanism to ensure dialogue remains 
open between council and industry, and to some extent within industry.  The nature of 
destination politics means it is likely no governance structure will please all 
stakeholders. For example, should industry board members be selected by the mayor 
on the basis of ability, a process subject to accusations of bias and favouritism? Or 
should members be democratically elected, a system that can reward attributes other 
than ability? The current public-private partnership ensures local government remains 
in touch with the stakeholders of the city’s most economically important industry. 
Open and formal communication about matters relating to marketing budgets and 
infrastructure maintenance should ensure no repeat of Rotorua’s previous fall from 
grace. 
  
17
 
In 1996, I resigned after seven years with Tourism Rotorua to take up a position in 
higher education. By this time the organisation comprised a marketing office with six 
staff and an annual budget of $1 million, a visitor centre with 11 staff and turnover in 
excess of $3 million, and the redeveloped Rotorua Convention Centre. Later in 1996, 
Tourism Rotorua released the district’s first strategic plan for tourism. By 2006 the 
RTO budget had increased to $1.6 million. 
 
It is clear the council-led initiatives since 1988 have been successful in improving the 
destination’s image among trade and consumers. For example, by 1997 Tourism 
Rotorua became the first RTO to achieve a ‘distinction’ at the New Zealand Tourism 
Awards for winning the ‘Best RTO’ award on three occasions. The district has also 
been a recipient of New Zealand’s beautiful city award in 1999, 2000 and 2002. In 
2005 Air New Zealand announced plans to name one of its Boeing 747 aircraft 
‘Rotorua’, and the district’s starring role in the NTO’s formative years was 
acknowledged when Tourism New Zealand staged it’s 2001 centennial celebrations in 
the city. In the first data from the NZ Regional Visitor Monitor (June, 2006), a new 
survey of international and domestic visitors managed by the Ministry of Tourism and 
Tourism New Zealand, 88% of respondents were interested in returning to Rotorua, 
and 78% indicated they would recommend the destination to friends (Marshall, 2006). 
The national benchmarks were 85% and 69% respectively.   
 
Conclusion 
In the emerging literature on destination disaster management, there has been little 
written on management crises. There is a difference between what constitutes a 
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disaster and what is a crisis (Faulkner, 1999), and not all tourism crises manifest as a 
result of a sudden exogenous disaster. The purpose of this paper has been to provide a 
cautionary tale of how one resort destination struggled through a self inflicted tourism 
crisis. The investigation of aspects of Rotorua’s tourism history provides an enhanced 
understanding of the evolution of New Zealand’s first holiday destination, adding to 
the recent efforts of Ateljevic (1998), Ateljevic and Doorne (2000), Horn, Fairweather 
and Simmons (2000), and Pike (2002). It could be argued the premise that Rotorua’s 
stakeholders were the authors of the destination’s demise is a harsh one given the 
lengthy time period and range of stakeholders involved. Nevertheless, a crisis did take 
place through what can retrospectively be described as ineffective responses by 
stakeholders to a changing macroenvironment and decline in destination quality. Five 
main reasons are proposed. First, there was an unpreparedness by stakeholders for a 
different future. Hall (2005) has suggested in tourism there exists a tendency to 
assume the unthinkable will not happen. This implies the future will continue to 
evolve as per the past. A state of ‘marketing dependence’ manifested in Rotorua, 
where the destination was used to the NTO taking responsibility for promotion. There 
was a lengthy delay in the recognition of the need to be proactive in infrastructure 
maintenance and promotion, at levels commensurate with the value of tourism to the 
local economy. Second, there was an over reliance on central government funding and 
support. The failure of the sanatorium concept was a major catalyst in the withdrawal 
of central government support between the 1950s and 1990s, during which time 
Rotorua stagnated. Third, the lack of forward planning and infrastructure maintenance 
led to a tired and run down cityscape, which became the topic of much negative 
national media attention. Fourth, the fortress mentality that existed among key 
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decision makers delayed the necessary recovery efforts. Fifth, there was an inability 
by the local tourism community to become organised in a collaborative way. 
 
In terms of a conceptual framework to better understand the case, Butler’s (1980) 
destination life cycle can be linked to the changes in Rotorua’s tourism development. 
The examination of Rotorua’s history supports Butler’s proposal that destinations are 
dynamic and evolve over time, as well as Plog’s (1974) assertion that the evolution of 
destinations can change or obliterate the nature of attractions responsible for the 
area’s popularity: “Destination areas carry with them the potential seeds of their own 
destruction, as they allow themselves to become more commercialised and lose their 
qualities which originally attracted tourists” (Plog, 1974, p. 58). The Rotorua case is 
an example of a destination that progressed through the development and growth 
stages, before stagnating without forward planning. A more recent example of 
potential stagnation is the Australian state of New South Wales, where tourism groups 
have called for a recovery plan to regain business lost since the 2000 Olympics, with 
tourism employment growth well behind the national average (Jones, 2006).  
 
Russell and Faulkner’s (1999) analysis of the development of the Australian Gold 
Coast suggested while destinations do evolve through the life cycle in a similar 
pattern, the instigators of change can be quite different. They introduced chaos theory 
to the model, to demonstrate the significance of the contributions of a few individual 
entrepreneurs. Each was responsible for an innovation that stimulated a sequence of 
changes, resulting in a major shift in the structure of tourism at the destination. In 
Rotorua however, it is argued that while entrepreneurs have played an important role 
in tourism development, it has been the initiatives of central and local government 
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that have shaped the destination’s fortunes. There have been three phases in Rotorua’s 
competitiveness as a tourism destination. From the 1880s until at least the 1950s, 
Rotorua was managed by central government, with levels of infrastructure 
development and destination promotion unparalleled in New Zealand. A gradual 
withdrawal of government resources saw Rotorua neglect both destination promotion 
and city beautification between the 1950s and the 1980s; a period when Rotorua’s 
destination image declined to such a point that local government, the public, tourism 
operators and travel trade intermediaries ultimately acknowledged that at crisis point 
had been reached. The period since 1988 has seen a gradual turnaround in destination 
competitiveness as a result of RDC’s increased commitment to destination marketing, 
product development and cityscape rejuvenation.  RDC’s philosophical and financial 
commitment led to a new spirit of cooperation among the private sector and between 
industry and local government. The turnaround has been such that few visitors to 
Rotorua today would be aware of the negative images of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.  
 
Although “the intensity of the moment during a crisis is clearly not the time to 
commence such planning” (Litvin & Alderson, 2003), this was the reality in Rotorua, 
and will be the case in the future for other destinations without contingency plans. In 
Turkey for example, neither the government nor the private sector had in place any 
plans to deal with that country’s 2001 economic crisis (Okumus & Karamustafa, 
2005). Texts have existed for at least two decades to guide organisations’ preparation 
of planning for potential crises (see for example Finks, 1986). The diversity of 
disasters and crises impacting on destinations in every continent in recent years 
implies all DMOs must be prepared for a future of continuous discontinuous change. 
  
21
This should be based on the view that while it is impossible to predict the exact source 
of a future tourism crisis, it is entirely feasible to expect one will occur…one day.   
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